Psychology, inequality and populism

What does the psychology literature tell us about how socio-economic inequality contributes to support for right-wing populist parties?

In recent decades (and increasingly in recent years, months and weeks), observers and policymakers in the UK have been paying increasing attention to the relationship between socio-economic inequality and populism, and more specifically right-wing populism. With the rise of Reform UK, broader anti-immigrant and racist discourse, and increasing levels of socio-economic inequality, we must collectively reckon with this dynamic and its social, economic, and political consequences.

This was the focus of a recent panel event at the LSE International Inequalities Institute, featuring Liam Byrne MP, Dr Faiza Shaheen, Professor Jonathan Hopkin, and Professor Mike Savage. Here’s the recording.

Liam, building on the arguments of his recent book, The Inequality of Wealth (launch event), described the “moral emergency” that is the current state of wealth inequality in the UK today. He suggested that wealth inequality is not only morally reprehensible, but is also clearly an economic and political disaster.

Liam also presented his recent analysis of the relationship between wealth and support for Reform UK, in which he found a negative association between measures of wealth and the percentage of voters in a constituency that voted for Reform. In other words, constituencies that had seen less wealth growth over recent years saw a much higher Reform vote share at the general election earlier this year.

This is also not to say that those with higher levels of wealth do not also support right-wing populist leaders or parties. This kind of analysis can only provide so much insight into this relationship based on the limited number of measures included. And we don’t need to look very far to see evidence of those with wealth in society supporting populist politics; just look at Elon Musk’s millions in support to the Trump campaign, and his apparent (albeit recently denied) offer to channel $100m to Reform UK.

How does economic inequality influence support for right-wing populism? Faiza’s presentation showed how populist leaders construct clear boundaries between social groups - whether those are between men and women, different ethnic groups, or rich and poor. Such narratives are used effectively by populist leaders to gain public support for their political agenda, which is pitched as offering the ‘in-group’ protection from threats posed by ‘out-groups’, whoever they may be.

To explore the relationship between wealth and economic inequality more generally, and support for right-wing populism in particular, insights from psychological research can be informative. Jay et al. (2022) suggest that inequality can increase support for right wing populist parties through several reinforcing mechanisms related to social identity and threat perception.

First, economic inequality has been shown to lead to decreased social cohesion and levels of trust. As levels of economic inequality increase and divisions between socio-economic groups become both more visible and relevant to daily life, the boundaries between groups become sharper. Consequently, as these group-level differences become increasingly clear and meaningful, relations between groups can begin to break down - as shown by reduced trust and cooperation, and increases in negative stereotypes and prejudiced beliefs about others.

Jay and colleagues draw on social categorisation theory to explain these effects. Socio-economic status becomes an increasingly important way for people to understand themselves and others, creating clear cleavages between different socio-economic groups. At the same time, rising socio-economic inequality can increase perceived threats to people’s group and their identity, both for the rich (who fear losing their wealth), and for the poor (who experience stronger perceptions of relative deprivation in comparison to other groups). These perceived threats can increase anxiety and fear, in turn undermining prosocial and cooperative behaviours between groups.

Second, it is in this context of rising perceived threats that right-wing populist leaders and parties can gain support, potentially from across the socio-economic spectrum. In the face of threats to their identity, people (quite reasonably) look for ways to manage their understanding of their world, and their sense of belonging, self-esteem, and broader sense of meaning in life. Appeals to national identity can be effective in restoring a sense of security by providing people with a way of making sense of the world and who they are within it, as well as giving them a sense of belonging to a group and of self-esteem.

We might expect that this dynamic could increase support for redistributive policies that aim to share resources with people’s in-group, but this is not necessarily the case. In fact, the reality of economic inequality can increase support for economic inequality, as it becomes more acceptable and is seen as legitimate in a society in which people cannot be trusted. The cycle is self-reinforcing, making it hard to break.

Third, this dynamic enables right-wing populists to propose policy responses that are based on supposed threats to ‘the nation’. These threats are usually articulated more in cultural than in explicitly economic terms. For example, anti-immigration rhetoric is usually couched in concerns about threats to national values and safety. By appealing to cultural values more than to economic interests, populists can appeal to people across the economic distribution, helping them to gain support from the rich and poor alike under a superordinate national identity.

By bringing together the “good people” of the nation under this banner, right-wing populists campaign on an anti-system platform that will never actually address the underlying socio-economic inequality that drives this spiral ever downward.

People seeking to make the opposite case need to actively consider how they can intervene in this cycle, with an eye to the social, economic, environmental, and political consequences of socio-economic inequalities. One place to start might be creating superordinate identities (higher-level social identities that are shared between groups). These can provide the security that socio-economic inequality takes away. But progress also depends on directly reducing the level of socio-economic inequality that makes people receptive to right-wing rhetoric in the first instance.

Rearticulating our sense of national identity in this context poses several interesting questions. I am currently working on a short report on long-term thinking, socio-economic inequality, and future generations in British politics. Here are some questions that I can currently thinking about:

• To what extent do concerns about intergenerational fairness feature as part of people’s understanding of what it means to be “British”?

• How does economic inequality influence concern for people across temporal distance, e.g. future generations?

• How does economic inequality influence children’s understanding of social and intergenerational justice?

• How does economic inequality influence children’s beliefs about the future of society and their place within it?

If you have any thoughts about these questions, please get in touch. Thank you!

Anita Sangha, Research Assistant, Fairness Foundation