Why ownership matters
An interview with James Vitali
The idea of a property-owning democracy has had an unusually varied life. Coined by the Conservative MP Noel Skelton in 1923, it was taken up by Thatcher through policies like Right to Buy, but has also shaped the centre-left through thinkers like James Meade and John Rawls. In The Ownership Society, James Vitali – former Head of Political Economy at Policy Exchange and Conservative councillor – makes the moral case for reviving it, arguing that Britain’s economic problems stem from the erosion of the shared values of responsibility, duty and stewardship. In this interview, Jack Jeffrey asks him what Thatcherism got wrong, whether wealth inequality is a problem, and how a property-owning democracy can avoid becoming what R.H. Tawney called an acquisitive society.
Jack Jeffrey (JJ): You start the book by declaring yourself both a conservative and a personalist, which you helpfully distinguish from socialism and liberalism. Personalism as a political doctrine can be very ambitious and radical, particularly insofar as it informs Catholic social teaching, which emphasises things like mutualism and cooperative models of ownership. I’m interested in how you can reconcile those two perspectives, the conservative perspective and the personalist perspective?
James Vitali (JV): I was very keen to think how economic views, political views, and cultural views need to find their place in a higher order of values. And for me those are basically religious values. Personalism to me was always a fundamental set of values that are spiritual and moral. At its most basic, it is about that deeply Christian idea that because humans are soul bearing, they therefore hold dignity. I am a church-going Christian, so it’s definitely got a religious dimension that is important to me. But there are also secular versions of this, with the most obvious one being Kant’s categorical imperative which is the idea you should never treat humans as a means to an end, but always as ends in themselves.
And then my conservatism, I suppose, is an extension of that, but it’s not the only way that you could take that personalist worldview. Conservatism is about conserving something. It’s common sensical because lots of people want to preserve something, be it family or property. But it’s noble too because it’s not selfish and it’s about maintaining things for other people’s benefits.
JJ: Near the beginning of the book, you reference Frank Meyer, whom you distinguish from Michael Oakeshott, who defined conservatism as preferring “the familiar to the unknown… the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible etc”. Meyer was famous for introducing this idea of fusionism, which was an attempt, in the US, to combine libertarianism with what they call traditionalism over there. And in Britain, Thatcherism was an attempt to reconcile free markets with conservatism. I’m interested in whether you think that project failed. And if what that project revealed was that unchecked, unregulated modern capitalism was always going to undermine tradition and culture, what should a new fusionism look like from your view?
JV: I probably think of myself more as an Oakeshottian than a Meyerist. But I think Meyer says something of real interest for today. That is, what do small-c conservatives do when the things that they really hold dear are in such a parlous state, particularly when it comes to our institutions. Is our responsibility to take what we have now, the short-term inheritance of the post-1997 settlement when it comes to the British constitution, or our current economic arrangements, and just preserve that? Or is it to find something slightly more immutable, something that we can attach a greater long-term significance to? Meyer encourages conservatives towards the latter view. If there’s something you want to conserve that’s been lost or degraded, and you want to bring our institutions back to that thing or that state that you cherished, it’s a much better rallying call for conservatives than simply slowing down trends.
And in terms of what fusionism means today. Meyer’s argument about fusionism is a very old idea. Frankly, it’s a Burkean idea. Edmund Burke has this wonderful quote: “But what is liberty without wisdom, and without virtue? It is the greatest of all possible evils; for it is folly, vice, and madness, without tuition or restraint.” All of the sensible thinkers in the history of political thought on the right have said that humans are dualistic. We want to be recognised as individuals, but we get our sense of status and value from our relational existence. I often juxtapose conservatism, which tries to emphasise that duality – the rights of the individual, but also their obligations within a community – against socialists, who would emphasise the rights of the group over the individual, and liberals, who say that the self-regarding part of human nature is all-important and should come at the expense of obligations to the community.
I think we’ve lost sight of that today, and that gets us to Thatcher and Thatcherism. I don’t think Thatcher is guilty of this, and it frustrates me the way she is caricatured today. She was a Methodist before she was a liberal or a Hayekian. She believed deeply in community. She just didn’t think that community is an abstract thing that sits at the level of the state that you can transpose responsibilities onto. But Thatcherites, and potentially people who have represented the conservative movement since, have been guilty of not recognising that duality. They’ve emphasised the individual over the community to the extent that many of the things that I care about – those communities that sit between the individual and the state, from the family through to the neighbourhood or the local area – have been neglected. They’re not doing well. I recognise the challenge.
JJ: Your book is titled The Ownership Society and seems to be heavily influenced by this idea of a property-owning democracy. That phrase was first coined by the Conservative MP Noel Skelton in 1923, but it has defied the political categories of left and right. It was a central theme in the mid-century liberal egalitarian project advocated by people like John Rawls via, interestingly, the British Labour economist James Meade. Why do you think this idea appeals to people with very different politics?
JV: I think it’s something that relates back to personalism maybe. There’s something about property ownership, not in an acquisitive sense, but in the sense of having something that is yours and is somehow an extension of you and which you can pass on to someone that you care about. I think that’s bound up with this idea of human dignity.
Anthony Crosland in The Future of Socialism (1956) writes about the property-owning democracy and how properly organised, it can be a socialist idea rather than a conservative one. I obviously disagree, but just to entertain that for a moment. I think for me, the key justification for a property-owning democracy is about the power relationship between government and those who are governed. But for those on the left, a lot of thinking revolves around employment. In Meade’s Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property (1964) he writes about the fact that if you have property, then your relationship with an employer is fundamentally changed and you have a degree of independence from them. That’s really interesting when you think about it today: risk aversion in the labour market, the fact that setting up a business and taking risk is less attractive and that it’s more desirable to have a very stable, very well-regulated job where you’re given a salary that can support a particular lifestyle.
On the property-owning democracy’s lineage more generally, it’s to some extent a republican idea. In the past people who believe in the idea of a property-owning democracy would have argued that to vote you needed to be a property owner, because property ownership inculcates a certain set of values about responsibility, having a stake, and so on. That’s a very long-standing idea in the republican tradition. It’s obviously flipped on its head in the context of universal franchise. The genius of Skelton was to recognise that because everyone can now vote we need to give as many people as possible the opportunity to be property owners.
It’s also definitely connected with some complicated sociological features of this country: small families, the necessity for small families to be both independent and mutually supportive, and how that played out with the growth and development of the British state.
JJ: Just on this. I’m very interested in Alan Macfarlane’s book, The Origins of English Individualism (1978), which seems to be enjoying a bit of a renaissance at the moment. The argument of that book is that this idea of a property-owning society in England predates modern industrial capitalism. How far do you think this is a political project that is uniquely English and therefore not really universalisable, particularly if you look across the continent?
JV: I think it’s manifestly the case that, if you just take the residential property market, there are profound differences between the sentiments of people in this country and in, for example, Germany, where there are much higher levels of private and social rent. It’s possibly not exclusively a UK phenomenon, but it is definitely an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. I suppose that would make sense. The people who went to the United States, Canada and Australia, which have similar issues with their property markets, in most cases left the UK, or England as it then was, because they thought they were the true English men and women, carrying the values of their inheritance much more faithfully than a corruptible parliament. That was at least the case for the American colonists.
I’m happy to concede that this isn’t a universalisable project, but that doesn’t particularly bother me, insofar as I’m a particularist, as I think most conservatives are. And I think the job of good conservatives in politics is to work out what is unique and distinctive about the country we live in, and how to preserve a state of affairs that is good for the prosperity of the people who live there.
It also comes back to the distinction between politics, economics, culture and morality. You can believe personalism applies everywhere, and I do. But I don’t necessarily think it applies in the same specific political, economic and cultural ways in the US or on the continent as it does in the UK.
JJ: I want to move on to more economic questions, particularly those related to what we focus on at the Fairness Foundation. You argue that private property should be justified at the personal level rather than at the social or aggregate level. I’m interested in whether, how and in what ways that changes your view of wealth disparities. If property is justified by how it helps a person flourish, is there a point beyond which more of it stops doing that, and possibly even becomes corrupting? And I’m asking this particularly in relation to the republican political theory you draw on, which sees freedom as not being subject to someone else’s will, i.e. not being dominated.
JV: It’s not so much that I think property ownership can only be justified at an individual level. People do justify it at a social level, and I write about that: the idea that a wide distribution of ownership is good for social stability, particularly in a democratic society. That is a group argument for why we should attach value to it. But for me, it’s much easier to erode the things that make property valuable, the independence and the dignity it provides, if its justification is at the group level. My book is about bringing the centre of gravity in our society back down, away from the state and towards the individual, because I think the personalist worldview is an anchor. It suggests things that can’t be transgressed. It has an idea of the sacred, which can’t be traded. I think that’s really important for the longevity of ideas about property and ownership.
In terms of what it means in practice, this comes back to your point about inequality, and maybe some of the differences between left and right advocates of property ownership. Inequality doesn’t press on me as much as many of the other issues we face as a society.
I suppose we have to be careful about what we mean by inequality. I believe in a very profound form of equality: we’re all humans with dignity, and we have the right to exercise our free will in leading moral lives. And I’m very nervous about the vast inequality that can exist between government and the people subject to it. But because I justify property and ownership at the level of the individual, I’m much more interested in a qualitative rather than a quantitative idea of property ownership. It’s about owning something, it doesn’t matter what: having something you’re responsible for, that you have a stake in, and whose consequences you must bear. That has a profound effect on an individual’s psychology, regardless of its monetary value.
On your point about corruption: the Bible is full of teachings about how excess and greed corrupt, so I’m very alive to that. I come from a military family, but also a lower-middle-class one, so I’m very sympathetic to that view. But the Bible is also replete with examples of people voluntarily helping others with their means, not being compelled to do so by some worldly authority.
I think people of immense means have a real responsibility to be generous with what they have. There’s nothing stopping them from setting up foundations, or a free school, or a new hospital, or some charitable housing initiative. My view is that the world is an unequal one, and the test of a good society is whether its citizens feel motivated to address that voluntarily. My idea of a good society is not one in which the state has immense powers to compel people to be more generous or more equal.
JJ: You also outline in the book why you think Thomas Piketty’s arguments are wrong. Perhaps you’d like to say a few words about that. You seem at least somewhat sympathetic to the problems of wealth disparity, or at least to some aspects of it, given what you say about some private equity business models, or what you call “fleecehold,” and predatory housing developers. Do you think it’s more important to differentiate between how people accumulate wealth, as opposed to how much they accumulate?
JV: Piketty’s arguments about inequality can almost entirely be accounted for by what’s going on in the property market. That growth in inequality is basically coming from the increased value of property, because of the artificial scarcity we’ve imposed on it, particularly in cities. Piketty’s case is that we need to tax people more and have a bigger government to regulate this, when actually high taxes and a very heavily regulated land market are the reason property values have soared, and why there is this inequality between generations when it comes to property.
When it comes to private equity, or other particular sectors of the UK economy, we’re moving from the quite abstract things we’ve been discussing to policymaking. Private equity is following a set of incentives that have been set by government over a number of years. Its heyday probably isn’t now; it was five or six years ago, when debt was cheap and there were lots of assets and a great deal of capital floating around. It would be entirely possible to change those incentive structures. One thing I’m interested in is whether you could levy capital gains tax on a sliding scale, so that your exposure reduces over time, to encourage people to take longer-term stakes. There would be disruption and dislocation, and you have to be very careful about doing that. What I don’t want conservatives to do is adopt their own version of social rationalism: to say, we have our own idea of what a good society looks like, and we’re going to compel people, businesses and communities into doing what we want. We have to avoid that. Nevertheless, the state can’t help but influence incentives by what it does, so we might as well create incentives that support the sort of culture we believe in.
On how people accumulate versus how much. I think that’s a fair distinction. You have to be careful about how much of a moral view you take of people’s economic activities. But the idea that the economy is value-free, just a consumption exercise, is wrong. There are certain ways of making money that transgress personal dignity in such a way that we should be able to say: no, this practice isn’t right.
JJ: Following on this, I’m a big fan of Angus Hanton’s book Vassal State (2024). His argument is that we have sold off large parts of the British economy to foreign investors and that this has happened because Britain has had a very permissive takeover regime. When Thatcher came to power, overseas investors held less than 4% of UK quoted shares; now it’s well over half. Do you think that’s a problem? And is what we need a more bordered political economy?
And related to that, there’s a wonderful line in Charles Moore’s biography of Thatcher: that she set out to make a country in the image of her father, a small business owner, and ended up making one in the image of her son, a profligate trader. Did the ownership society Thatcher promised fail to materialise, and what does that tell us about the gap between the intentions behind those policies and their reality?
JV: Let me take the second question first. I use the words “tragedy” and “tragic” a lot at the start of the book, and Thatcher exemplifies that, as that excellent quote from Moore shows. She wanted to build the sort of society I’m describing, but it’s tragic insofar as, in pursuing it, her government and subsequent governments of both left and right created all these problems, even if not directly or intentionally. They undermined the sort of society Thatcher wanted to build, and we now have to deal with that. I suppose that’s the fallen nature of man. But it’s connected to your first question, and to the tragedy of liberalism: it wants to free people, but in practice it inadvertently creates dependencies, especially economic ones, as with energy and defence.
On a bordered political economy, I’d be careful about the concept. If you mean capital controls, I’m not straightforwardly in favour of those. What I would say is that we certainly need a political economy that is much more alive to national security, and to the development of a particular culture in the UK that is rooted in ownership.
One economic manifestation of liberal rationalism that I write about is the idea that the most important thing an economy can promote is consumption. Consumption is an expression of people following their own interests: you choose what you consume. It also feels value-neutral, like machinery. If consumption is high, the economic machine keeps plodding along, and if you increase it, the machine goes faster. The bad consequence is that we’ve neglected the other thing we need to do, which is to save for investment, putting capital where it will increase the long-term prosperity of our society. If you’re always focused on short-term consumption, you will necessarily neglect the long-term project of intergenerational prosperity.
How that plays out in our relationship with the world economy is that we’re quite willing to run a current account deficit, borrow lots of money and rely on high levels of foreign direct investment. Much as we celebrate foreign direct investment and the inflow of capital into the country, it is at least partly because we’re not generating the savings required for that investment domestically. That does create dependencies, and it makes us very exposed to the international economy and its fluctuations, especially in sectors like energy. The idea that we can keep importing all the resources required to power our economy, our homes and our businesses without being extremely vulnerable to an energy shock in some far-off part of the world is for the birds. It’s a deeply irresponsible way of approaching energy policy.
JJ: The point I was trying to make about a bordered political economy, particularly as it applies to the British right, is that the right has a very compelling story about how we’ve ceded control and power from the British state to courts, or quangos, or to international institutions. But as Burnham said in his Labour conference speech, the right doesn’t talk about taking back control of our public utilities, or, as I just mentioned, how we’ve given away control to foreign investors.
JV: That’s a fair point. On taking back control, I think the sentiment that drove Brexit, which crossed political divides and isn’t a partisan point, was partly about wanting a government that could actually get things done, and that was actually in control of our borders and so on. But we should be careful. The sense of helplessness and lack of control people feel at the moment will not be solved simply by making government more powerful. There’s a more direct control that people want over their own lives too. That said, I think it’s true that government has to take power back in order to give it away again, so that’s probably fair.
Some conservatives are beginning to think about this more carefully. One of the big consequences of our dependency on borrowing is indebtedness, and we’ve pledged that at least 50p in every pound of savings we make, if we’re in government next time round, will go towards reducing debt. People have realised we cannot just continue growing the national debt every year.
When it comes to water companies and so on, these seem to me to be technical issues with technical fixes. Should water companies be owned by private equity? Maybe not. But that seems to me more a technical question about how the market works than the things I’ve been speaking about. Interestingly, Clement Attlee tried to make the case that the property-owning democracy basically meant public ownership, and Churchill responded, in his typically cheeky style on the campaign trail, that this was ridiculous: knowing that the government owns some public utility doesn’t give a voter any real sense of ownership. That’s true. But my version of small-government conservatism is not neutral government. I do believe in a smaller state, and I think it’s absolutely essential, not only if we are to get the economy growing again, but if people are to start flourishing in greater numbers in this country. But I don’t believe the state has to be a neutral umpire. There are certain things only the state can do on our behalf, and loading it with extra responsibilities undermines its ability to do them. Utilities are potentially one such thing, but much more important are defence and policing, which have been vitiated. The government has both the right and the responsibility to have the means, whether in manufacturing or energy, to create the capabilities we require to defend ourselves. That’s entirely in keeping with my worldview.
JJ: Last question. I’m very interested in the unintended consequences of Right to Buy, which I think we both agree was a highly consequential policy. As a centre-left person, I don’t disagree with it in principle. It turned lots of council tenants, not least my grandparents, into homeowners, which is no bad thing. But research estimates that around 40 to 45% of homes bought under Right to Buy are now in the private rented sector. Do you think that’s a betrayal of the idea of a property-owning democracy? And, to finish, how do we protect against the promise of a property-owning democracy mutating into a speculative, or what R.H. Tawney would call an acquisitive, society?
JV: Right to Buy has had unintended consequences, but I don’t think they have anything to do with the policy itself. To my mind, it was a genius policy. There are very few policies the general public know by name, but people know Right to Buy. The reason it’s had these awful unintended consequences is fundamentally the planning system.
We obsess about affordable and social housing in this country for good reason: young people are paying through the nose just to rent poor-quality properties in cities. It’s definitely an issue. But affordability is ultimately a function of the private market, and if your private market is exceptionally dysfunctional, you will never solve affordability, however many homes you build for social rent. There will always be people who need that level of support. But the housing crisis in this country is not one of affordable housing. It’s the private market driving up property prices in general. If you keep loading obligations onto developers, you just perpetually increase the real cost of producing a new unit of housing, and affordability deteriorates.
My view is that we broadly need a more permissive approach to housing. There are lots of critics of the Town and Country Planning Act, for good reason, but I believe in at least the conceptual distinction between town and country. I think we should broadly have a different planning system for towns than for the countryside, and in towns it needs to be extremely permissive of densification. That’s a long-winded way of saying that this sclerotic, strange housing market, in which so many homes formerly owned by councils are now in the private rented sector, is not what the policy was intended to do. It’s a feature of the planning system in general rather than of Right to Buy specifically.
Tawney’s point about the property-owning democracy descending into acquisitiveness shows that you need more than a view of ownership as possession. Ownership has to be more than the possession of tangible things. It has to promote a certain set of values, and you have to emphasise that in policymaking. We now broadly see homes as an investment good rather than as a stake in a particular place. But that doesn’t have to be the case; it’s a political choice. My book is partly about encouraging people of my political disposition to think much more about the values they want to promote through policymaking, and not to see it as a neutral engineering exercise.


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